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Survey of Supercomputer Cluster Security Issues
G. Markowsky
Department of Computer Science
University of Maine
Orono, ME 04469-5752, USA
Abstract - The authors believe that providing security for
supercomputer clusters is different from providing security
for stand-alone PCs. The types of programs that
supercomputer clusters run and the sort of data available on
supercomputer clusters are fundamentally different from
the programs and data found on stand-alone PCs. This
situation might attract a different type of attacker with
different goals and different tactics. This paper discusses
the results of a questionnaire sent out to many
supercomputer clusters in the United States and relates
them to a literature search that was also undertaken. These
results suggest approaches that can be taken to further
secure supercomputer clusters.
Keywords:
questionnaire.

1

Supercomputer,

cluster,

site using harvested ssh passwords. The damage has been
estimated to exceed $100 million in the United States
alone. The intrusions were eventually traced to a Swedish
teenager who was visited by police. After the visit the
intrusions stopped. All together, approximately 1,000 sites
were compromised to some degree.
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Motivation

The Stakkato Intrusions

In the course of doing the research for this paper, we
came across a discussion of the “The Stakkato Intrusions.”
A very detailed discussion of this protracted attack against
supercomputer clusters can be found in Nixon [1]. Quoting
from the abstract we have: During 15 months, from late
2003 until early 2005, hundreds of supercomputing sites,
universities and companies worldwide were hit in a series
of intrusions, with the perpetrator leapfrogging from site to

Some Questions

Some of the questions that we were hoping to get
some insight into were:

security,

As a result of working in cybersecurity and working
on some classified supercomputer computations, we
became curious about whether the security problems for
supercomputer clusters were different from those faced by
desktops. Some of the reasons for suspecting that there
might be differences are:
• different types of data, including classified data;
• interest on the part of governments;
• access to great computing power;
• the greater sophistication of users;
• the greater sophistication of attackers.
Additionally, it is clear that supercomputer cluster
operators are aware of each other, so the supercomputer
cluster network might be a tempting target. Our goals were
to get some insight into the state of the art in cluster
security and to help cluster operators secure their clusters.
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What is the level of computer security expertise
shown among cluster operators?
To what extent are clusters targeted by
organizations rather than random hackers?
How common are physical or social engineering
attacks?
How sophisticated are the attackers?

The Survey

In designing a survey we worried about several factors.
Of particular concern to us were the following:
• The survey must not be intrusive.
• We must get people to trust us enough to complete
the survey.
• The survey must not reveal weak spots to potential
adversaries.
• The survey must be short and easy to complete.
• The survey should preserve anonymity.
While we do not believe in security through obscurity, we
also did not want to call attention to any particular
institution because of our work.
We were very concerned that we would not be able to get
enough responses to provide some interesting results, but
we were able to get 61 valid responses along with nine emails discussing various aspects of the survey. Everyone
who responded either sent an e-mail or filled out the
questionnaire that we made available on the password
protected website: http://www.cs.umaine.edu/~markov/
clustersurvey/survey.html. We made no effort to track the
source of the responses since we promised to keep all
responses anonymous.

3.1

Pool of Potential Participants

We decided on a two-pronged distribution scheme. First,
we created a list of e-mail addresses of supercomputer
administrators and users. This took some time since people
are taking more care to keep their e-mail addresses private.
All told, we sent out well over 250 e-mails to various
people. The addresses were all distinct, but in some cases
we sent e-mail to more than one person at a location
because we were not sure who would respond. Figure 1
shows the distribution of the e-mail addresses that we
carefully tracked.

Questions 1 through 5 are fairly straightforward and the
responses are also easy to interpret, so we will not discuss
them further.

Figure 3: Question 2 Responses

Figure 1: Distribution of the 247 e-mail Addresses
Second, we posted our questionnaire on various
USENET user group sites and used the beowulf.org mailing
list as well as some securityfocus.com mailing lists.

3.2

Responses

We were pleased to receive 61 completed and valid
questionnaires before writing this paper. Completed
questionnaires consisting entirely of “No Answer”
responses were omitted from our results, which are
presented below as a series of pie charts.
Figure 4: Question 3 Responses

Figure 2: Question 1 Responses

Figure 5: Question 4 Responses

Figure 6: Question 5 Responses
Figure 9: Question 8 Responses
We noticed that the same number of respondents (5) said
“Yes” to Question 7 as said “Yes” to Question 8. We
looked at the responses to see whether they were the same
people. It turns out that only 2 people said “Yes” to both
questions. Thus, a total of 8 respondents out of 61 either
encountered a physical attempt to breach security or an
attempt to co-opt one of the cluster operators.

Figure 7: Question 6 Responses
We thought that the overwhelming majority would
answer “Not Sure” to Question 6, since we were not sure
how people would determine if they had been attacked by
foreign interests. It is clear that the majority of respondents
feel confident enough to give a “Yes” or “No” answer. This
suggests that it is worthwhile to investigate this question
further.

Figure 10: Question 9 Responses
It was interesting to note that no respondents reported
between 6 and 10 security breaches, but that one
respondent reported 11 or more incidents that resulted in
downtime or lost data.

Figure 8: Question 7 Responses

We were surprised that only a third of the respondents
stated that they checked for rootkits at least on a daily basis.
The Stakkato Intrusions were characterized by the
installation of rootkits on many servers.

Figure 11: Question 10 Responses

Figure 14: Question 13 Responses
The situation for backing up seems to be much better
than checking for rootkits since 75% of respondents stated
that they backed data up at least daily.

3.3

Figure 12: Question 11 Responses
We were surprised to learn that at least a quarter of the
respondents are not running an intrusion detection system
on their clusters. It seems that another 25% are only
running intrusion detection systems on some of their
clusters. We recommend that all clusters run an intrusion
detection system of some kind.

Some Letters

As we noted earlier, we also received nine e-mail letters in
response to our questionnaire. We classified the letters into
four categories as illustrated in Figure 15. Two letters
wanted to verify that we were indeed the source of the
questionnaire. One letter notified us of a duplicate request
from us. Two letters stated an interest in receiving copies of
the results. Finally, four letters offered some comments on
the questionnaire and the issues of cluster security. We will
discuss these four letters in greater detail.

Figure 15: Classification of Letters Received
Letter 1:

Figure 13: Question 12 Responses

I believe that the most important question is missing:
"Have you classified or proprietary data on your cluster?"
Otherwise the cluster is "not worth attacking". A normal
university or hobby cluster will be defended differently than
a sensitive one. Of course the question itself is sensitive.

We were reluctant to ask questions of this type because we
did not want people to think that we were footprinting their
sites. Furthermore, we feel that all clusters are worth
attacking because they can provide a trusted base for
further attacks as was done in the Stakkato Intrusions.
Finally, all clusters are worth attacking since they can
provide a lot of computational power for such activities as
password cracking. For this reason we believe that all
clusters deserve to be defended vigorously.

start up something that tries to listen on the outside
interface it remains unreachable by naughty people.
Once you lock it down like that, the number of potential
problems decreases pretty drastically. For some things
(apache server-status and so on), I have access restricted
to my workstation in the apache config. For compute
clusters, I can't see the need for lots of off-campus access,
so even locking things down to on-campus users doesn't
seem overly restrictive.

Letter 2:
I would like to point out that the use model for clusters is
what drives most of the important security risks and is the
primary threat. Laptop/desktop and standard commercial
activities do not normally involve giving a large number of
users shell access. Very few HPC systems run through
portals where the OS is isolated from the user.
So the starting point for a cluster is where the 85% of the
standard security stops (don't let the bad guy get a shell).
Compromised user desktops will immediately lead to a user
level compromise of the cluster. If you don't manage the
user desktops (they might not be yours) you must assume
that there is an account compromise.
The important question is what do you do then?
The problem of protecting internal resources from
compromised user desktops/laptops is very serious. In some
organizations it has led to the creation of internal firewalls
to protect internal resources from users. We also feel that a
variety of steps can be taken to protect internal resources
even if user computers are compromised.
Even if a keylogger has been installed on the desktop,
there are ways of protecting the cluster. For example, users
could be required to use key-based authentication, with the
key kept on removable media, not on the hard drive.
Alternatively, systems can require keys together with onetime passwords. In such cases, user-level compromise is
still possible, but it would hardly be "immediate". Another
possibility is the Trellis system [6] mentioned later.
Letter 3:
I think that the best way to keep clusters secure is to hide
the compute nodes on a private network and keep them
totally inaccessible from the outside world. Any access to
compute nodes is through the master node. Compute nodes,
if they need to be installed or updated, do so from a
repository on the master node. The master node, then, is
firewalled on the public interface, with only a few ports
open-- ssh, http, https, and so on.
The internal interface is wide open, since you never know
what researchers are going to want to run, but even if they

Overall, I've found our compute resources to be much less
likely to attract security problems than our public systems.
We aren't doing any DoD research or anything, though.
Monitoring the compute nodes as well as the master node
enhances security. Furthermore, we feel that many users are
security naive and we think that it is good to have some
controls over what they run.
Letter 4 was quite long and covered too many topics for
us to discuss it here. There is one passage from this letter
that we would like to quote:
Over the decades I have accumulated a number of
interesting anecdotes on security -- major cracks of systems
in our medical center, a Bulgarian grad student who
engaged in rampant data theft on a chemistry cluster
shipping research data on rational drug design back to
Bulgaria, and more.
The worst incidents that resulted in actual damage were
of this sort -- "inside jobs" where lax security boundaries
INSIDE an organization permitted unauthorized access, at
least until they were detected and bopped.
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Other Resources

We did an extensive literature search and uncovered
many relevant papers and resources. We will put the
materials and links at the following URL:
http://www.cs.umaine.edu/~markov/clustersecurity
Below we will list the abstracts of a representative set of
papers that we feel would be of interest to many cluster
operators.
Searching For Open Windows and Unlocked Doors:
Port Scanning In Large-scale Commodity Clusters by
Lee, Koenig, Meng, and Yurcik [2].
Current methods for monitoring the security of largescale commodity clusters tend to treat these clusters as
nothing more than collections of independent nodes. As
such, the techniques used to secure these clusters have, for
the most part, been adaptations of techniques developed
for securing and monitoring enterprise computing

environments. We have previously proposed the idea of
monitoring the security-state of large-scale commodity
clusters by examining their emergent properties, that is,
properties that are only visible when one ceases to look at
a cluster as a collection of disparate nodes and begins to
look at the properties of the cluster as a whole. We show
that by correlating the open network ports observed on
cluster nodes with other emergent properties - such as
active processes and the contents of important system filessecurity analysts can make insightful observations that can
greatly restrict the actions that an attacker can carry out
undetected.
Intrusion-Tolerant Server Architecture for Survivable
Services by Min [3].
Survivable systems are increasingly needed in a wide
range of applications. As a step toward realizing
survivable systems, this paper presents architecture of
intrusion-tolerant servers. It is to deliver intended services
transparently to the clients even when a computing node
fails due to failures, intrusions, and other threats. In order
to deliver only secure results to the client, we need an
algorithm to decide agreement on results from replicated
servers. For this purpose, a secure and practical
decentralized voting algorithm for the architecture is
proposed in the paper. Through the experiments on a testbed, especially, for web services, the approach turned out
very effective in terms of extra cost and considered to be
able to cope with both confidentiality and integrity attacks.
NvisionCC: A Visualization Framework For High
Performance Cluster Security by Yurcik, Meng, and
Kiyanclar [4].
Large high performance clusters are gaining
popularity as a means of harnessing vast computing
resources at low cost using commodity components.
Cluster system administrators face difficulty from two
related problems. First, while several cluster monitoring
solutions collect data on the node state and overall
performance of a cluster, few monitors place emphasis on
the meaningful visual presentation of this information
which is increasingly important as cluster size in nodes
grows beyond the human capability to manage using
command line tools. Second, while cluster state and
performance data have been visually monitored in several
systems, there are currently no cluster monitors that
visualize cluster security events. We have developed a
framework for effective visualization of a high performance
cluster security which we describe in this paper. We
present GUI screenshots from a security visualization tool
based on this framework and discuss our experience using
this tool on high performance clusters at NCSA.

Detecting Anomalies In High-Performance Parallel
Programs by Florez, Liu, Bridges, Vaughn, and Skjellum
[5].
Message Passing Interface (MPI) is an effective
programming technique for implementing parallel
programs for distributed computation. As these
applications run, a number of different types of
irregularities can occur including those that result from
intrusions, user misbehavior, corrupted data, deadlocks or
failure of cluster components. In this paper, we perform a
comparison of different artificial intelligence (AI)
techniques that can be used to implement a lightweight
monitoring and detection system for parallel applications
on a cluster of Linux workstations. We study the accuracy
and performance of deterministic and stochastic
algorithms when we observe the flow of function library
and OS system calls of parallel programs written with
MPI. We demonstrate that monitoring of MPI programs
can be achieved with high accuracy and in some cases with
a 0% false positive rate in real-time, and we show that the
added computational load on each node is small. Finally
we demonstrate that simple deterministic methods perform
poorly when the program flow grows in size and variety,
and that more complex methods are required.
The Trellis Security Infrastructure For Overlay
Metacomputers And Bridged Distributed File Systems
by Lu, Closson, Macdonell, Nalos, Ngo, Kan, and Lee [6].
Researchers often have non-privileged access to a
variety of high-performance computer (HPC) systems in
different administrative domains, possibly across a widearea network. Consequently, the security infrastructure
becomes an important component of an overlay
metacomputer: a user-level aggregation of HPC systems.
The Trellis security infrastructure (TSI) is layered on top of
the widely-deployed secure shell (SSH) and systems
administrators only need to provide unprivileged accounts
to the users. The contribution of TSI is in demonstrating
that a single sign-on (SSO) system, for a variety of usecase scenarios, can be implemented without requiring a
completely new security infrastructure. We describe the use
of TSI for a Canada-wide overlay metacomputer, for
computational workloads (i.e., CISS-3) that spanned 22
administrative domains, at its peak had over 4000
concurrent jobs, and included a new distributed file system
(i.e., Trellis NFS).
NIDS Architecture for Clusters by Gadaud [7].
Intrusion detection is a security concept implemented
on networks in various academic and commercial
solutions. Most of them rely on sensors dedicated to local
area networks or Internet. However clusters rely heavily
on networks. Because of their uniformity, they are sensible
to attacks: one compromised node can lead to the control

of whole cluster. In order to solve such security issues, we
purpose a NIDS architecture which addresses the same
constraints as a cluster: efficiency, scalability and
reliability. It is based on the cluster paradigm. We stress
on the facts that network packets must be dispatched
according to streams and analysis must be load-balanced
at the process level. Moreover two types of practical
parallel analysis are presented, depending on the type of
flows. Finally, we discuss implementations and
dimensioning issues.
Instant Attack Stopper in Infiniband Architecture by
Lee, Kim, Yum, and Yousif [8].
With the growing popularity of cluster architectures
in datacenters and the sophistication of computer attacks,
the design of highly secure clusters has recently emerged
as a critical design issue. However, the majority of cluster
security research has focused on how to detect and prevent
attacks rather than on how to minimize the effect of attacks
once detected. The action against detected attacks in the
cluster is as important as the actual detection process since
no detection mechanism is full-proof in its ability to protect
cluster systems without the effective cluster-wide reaction.
In this paper, we propose a scheme, referred to as the
Instant Attack Stopper (IAS) that can instantly confront
security attacks in a cluster. Specifically we provide
detailed implementation methods of IAS in InfiniBand
Architecture (IBA) - a new promising communication
standard for future System Area Networks (SANs) and
clusters.
IAS focuses on removing malicious
communication on the IBA fabric among processes
involved in an attack, which is accomplished through the
proposed Security Management Agent (SeMA). We will
show IAS deployment in different security levels to meet
various security requirements.
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Recommendations

A number of respondents seem to feel that security is
well taken care of. The Stakkato Intrusions suggest that no
one should get too relaxed about security. It also seems that
quite a number of clusters are being managed somewhat
loosely, and that they would have difficulty withstanding a
determined attack from a sophisticated foe.
We feel that it is beneficial for cluster operators to
exchange information about practices and we hope that our
survey makes a contribution in this area.

6

Future Work

Our experience with this questionnaire has encouraged us
to consider repeating the process in a year or so with a
redesigned questionnaire based on our experience. We are
also planning to post these results and a more complete
literature search at the URL mentioned earlier:

http://www.cs.umaine.edu/~markov/clustersecurity
Finally, we will try to organize more sessions devoted to
the topic of security of supercomputer clusters, with the
intention of helping this area emerge as a distinct specialty.
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